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Guatemala: New Government Peace Proposal Revives
Negotiations, But Final Peace Accord A Long Way Off
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department:  General
Published:  Friday, February 5, 1993
[The author, an analyst of Guatemalan affairs who lived in Central America from 1980-1992, is
currently economic affairs editor at LADB] In mid-January, President Jorge Serrano launched a
bold peace proposal aimed at reviving negotiations with the guerrillas, stalled since last August.
In essence, the initiative calls for the acceleration of talks to negotiate a final accord within three
months, and suggests for the first time since the war began 33 years ago that both sides declare
a bilateral cease fire if the dialogue delegations fail to reach an agreement by April. Although
the proposal set the peace process rolling again with a new round of talks now tentatively set for
late February the initiative is unlikely to produce rapid progress at the bargaining table. Despite
some important government concessions, most opposition groups say the initiative does not
reflect any major change in government policy. Given the proposal's overlap with the opening
of the UN's annual human rights hearings in Geneva, many suspect Serrano is simply trying to
divert international attention away from rights abuses in Guatemala. Moreover, even if the two
sides sign an accord on human rights the agenda item now under discussion the delegations
are bound to deadlock again over the remaining points of negotiation. Indeed, in response to
the government's proposal, the rebels presented new dialogue demands at the end of January,
including a 50% reduction of the Armed Forces and a purge of the officer corps. The government
rejected those demands outright, foreshadowing heated debate when talks begin again. New
Peace Proposal On Jan. 14, in his second annual address to Congress, President Serrano captured
domestic and international attention by announcing the most important peace initiative since the
government opened direct talks with the rebels in April 1991. Serrano proposed that the two sides
immediately hold non-stop, marathon sessions to completely negotiate all points contained in
the 11-item dialogue agenda. If a final peace accord cannot be reached within 90 days, then both
sides would declare a bilateral cease fire, and the government would designate security zones
where the guerrillas would relocate while negotiations continue. In addition, in an effort to jump
start negotiations, Serrano made his biggest dialogue concession to date: an agreement to allow
all accords signed on human rights to take effect immediately, rather than after a complete peace
accord is in place, plus a government-endorsed mandate to begin UN verification of respect for
human rights the moment accords are signed. The UN would also be responsible for supervising
the cease fire. All concessions, however, are contingent on the rebels' willingness to immediately
sign a human rights pact. "This is the biggest opening the government has ever offered to end the
armed conflict," said Serrano. "This will be the year of reconciliation and peace. I urge the guerrillas
to trade their rifles and machine guns for hoes and pens, since their only place in the country is
within legal bounds." Human rights the first point on the dialogue agenda has snagged the entire
peace process since mid-1991. From July 1991 to February 1992, both sides did manage to agree on
the skeletal framework of a human rights accord, with eight basic clauses in place that would, in
general, strengthen laws to enforce respect for civil liberties. For example, the government would
be committed to provide more resources for the judiciary, the attorney general, and the human
rights ombudsman, and such terms as "forced disappearance" and "extrajudicial assassination"
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would be included in the constitution as "crimes against humanity." But from February-August
1992, talks deadlocked over four guerrilla demands: 1) agreement to apply the Geneva conventions
on war regarding respect for the civilian population, war prisoners, and wounded combatants; 2) the
dissolution of Army-run civil defense patrols (Patrullas de Auto-Defensa Civil, PAC), estimated to
include about 800,000 males in the countryside; 3) formation of a "truth commission" to investigate
grave human rights abuses committed during the war; and 4) the immediate application of all
human rights clauses once they are signed, rather than await a final end to the war. In early August,
the delegations achieved a partial breakthrough when the guerrillas agreed to temporarily drop
their demand that the PAC be immediately disbanded, with the "understanding" that the PAC issue
would be discussed again in the final stages of negotiation, when rebel "demobilization" and an
end to "counterinsurgency structures" are reviewed. Under the August accord, the government
agreed to not promote the formation of new civil patrols, as long as the guerrillas do not "provoke"
their creation through military harassment of rural communities. In addition, the human rights
ombudsman was appointed to head a commission charged with verifying that all PAC membership
is voluntary (see CAU 08/14/92). Nevertheless, at the end of August the delegations deadlocked
again over the rebels' three remaining human rights demands, and all talks have been suspended
since then. By offering to apply the human rights pact immediately, then, President Serrano has
conceded to one of the three points still blocking progress at the bargaining table. In addition, by
requesting that the UN immediately verify respect for human rights, Serrano upped the political
stakes in peace negotiations, drawing unprecedented international attention to the fledgling
peace process, and increasing the pressure on both sides to sign an accord. In fact, immediately
following Serrano's speech to Congress, UN Secretary General Butros Butros Ghali invited Serrano
to UN headquarters in New York to discuss the initiative. From Jan. 18-20, Serrano met with
Butros-Ghali and other high-level UN officials, and formally presented his peace proposal in a
speech to the General Assembly. An entourage of government officials and opposition politicians
accompanied Serrano in an effort to present the initiative as a unified, national appeal for peace
by all the country's political parties. Among those who joined Serrano were ex-president Vinicio
Cerezo; former presidential candidates Jorge Carpio and Alfonso Cabrera from the Christian
Democrat and Centrist National Union parties, respectively; and Defense Minister Gen. Jose
Domingo Garcia. Domestic Criticism Nevertheless, despite the favorable international response,
Serrano's proposal drew harsh criticism from domestic opposition groups, which generally labelled
the proposal a government propaganda ploy to divert international attention away from ongoing
human rights abuses in Guatemala. Indeed, the initiative coincides with the opening of the UN's
annual hearings on human rights in Geneva (Jan. 27-Feb. 26), where a sharp rebuff of government
violations is expected (see other article in this edition). Moreover, as Serrano launched his proposal
in Guatemala, Guatemalan diplomats simultaneously fanned out throughout Europe and South
America in a well-planned lobbying blitz to win support for Guatemala at the Geneva hearings.
Reinforcing the opposition criticism, Serrano did not consult the mediator in peace negotiations
Monsignor Rodolfo Quezada over the proposal, even though Quezada is responsible for channelling
dialogue initiatives from one side to the other, and then convoking meetings to discuss issues. In
fact, Quezada was not even invited to join Serrano's delegation at the UN. "Serrano's proposal
came as a complete surprise, since there wasn't any attempt on the part of the government to reach
even minimal consensus with the mediating commission [headed by Quezada], much less civilian
sectors of society," said Rigoberta Menchu, the 1992 Nobel peace laureate. "I hope the initiative
reflects a sincere intent on the government's part, and not just an effort to influence the UN Human
Rights Commission in Geneva." Perhaps more important, the opposition criticized the proposal
LADB Article Id:  058068
ISSN:  1089-1560
©2011  The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved. Page 3 of 4
for only partially addressing the three issues snagging progress at the bargaining table, completely
sidestepping disagreements over the rebel-proposed "truth commission" and respect for Geneva
conventions on war. Since August, the government has adamantly rejected the guerrilla demand
that the UN appoint respected foreign diplomats to participate in the commission, insisting that it
consist exclusively of Guatemalans. And, since 1991, the government has refused to even consider
formal application of the Geneva conventions in Guatemala, since that would amount to official
recognition of the rebels as a "belligerent force" in the country, immediately offering the guerrillas
unmerited "military status" that could strengthen their hand in negotiations. Moreover, although
the government's call for a bilateral cease fire is the first such truce offering in 33 years of war,
Serrano's proposal smacks more of guerrilla surrender than a negotiated armistice. Serrano only
offered to designate security zones where the rebels would be relocated under UN supervision.
But such security zones would have to be designated for the Army as well, according to guerrilla
spokespersons, and in any case, the location of cease fire encampments must be negotiated at the
bargaining table, not picked at random by the government. Finally, although an important attempt
to push the negotiations forward, the government's call for 90-day marathon sessions is not new.
In mid-1992, Serrano urged the guerrillas to agree to a non-stop negotiation process whereby
the dialogue delegations would meet every other week to hammer out a peace accord as fast as
possible. But the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionario Nacional
Guatemalteco, URNG) which groups the country's four guerrilla organizations criticized that
proposal as a government attempt to sidestep serious discussion of the agenda items by artificially
pushing the talks forward before solid, lasting agreements can be reached. Not surprisingly, on
Jan. 21, the URNG labelled Serrano's proposal "one-sided, contradictory, and incomplete," since
in essence it demands that the guerrillas either agree to sign a final accord in 90 days, or be herded
into government-designated cease fire zones. "Serrano's initiative is one-sided because any sincere
proposal cannot present ultimatums, nor peremptorily demand unilateral concessions," read the
URNG's official communique. Still, rather than reject the proposal outright, the URNG responded
with a new list of dialogue demands to be incorporated into negotiations in exchange for the rebels'
endorsement of a cease fire. Although the government spurned virtually the entire URNG counter-
proposal, three rebel demands drew particularly harsh reactions: 1) immediate dissolution of all the
Army's civil defense patrols; 2) a 50% reduction in the size of the Armed Forces; and 3) appointment
of an "Ad Hoc Commission" to evaluate the service records of all Army officers and purge those
found guilty of human rights abuses. (This last demand is modeled on the Ad Hoc Commission
included in the Salvadoran peace accords.) "It's unbelievable that the guerrillas think they can
fool everybody by trying to create a false parallel between the Salvadoran and Guatemalan peace
processes when the two are completely different," responded President Serrano on Jan. 23. "I don't
understand why the guerrillas are now introducing entirely new demands that were not presented
in negotiations before." In a press conference on Jan. 25, Defense Minister Garcia accused the
guerrillas of attempting to win through negotiations what they are incapable of winning on the
battlefield. "The reduction and demobilization of the Army are not negotiable," said Garcia. "The
most the government can offer are political, not military concessions. A purge of the military's ranks
can only be decided by the High Command, together with the president as head of the Armed
Forces, since those are basic decisions which affect national security." Peace a Long Way Off As a
result, little progress is expected at the next round of talks. Rodolfo Quezada's mediating delegation
met with the URNG top command in Mexico in late January to finalize details for the upcoming
government-rebel meeting later this month, but Quezada somberly warned the public not to expect
major breakthroughs. "The meeting is only to reinitiate the dialogue, permitting both sides to
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exchange opinions and evaluate points of agreement, as well as divergence," said Quezada. "But no
false expectations should be created, because no accord will be signed." In fact, rather than diminish
military activity, Serrano's proposal will likely generate a new upsurge on the battlefield, as both
sides attempt to strengthen their hand at the bargaining table. On Jan. 14 just hours after Serrano
concluded his speech to Congress the URNG downed four huge electric towers in the north and
south of Guatemala City, blacking out 80% of the capital and most nearby provinces. Those attacks
ushered in a wave of rebel sabotage around the country throughout the second half of January.
Among other things, the URNG destroyed a major bridge in Alta Verapaz (about 220 km. north
of the capital), burned six trucks carrying 4,000 gallons of fuel in the oil-producing province of El
Peten, and downed telecommunications towers in the central province of Solola. All told, despite
the revival of negotiations, Serrano's proposal ironically underscores the difficulty of reaching a
peace accord in Guatemala. Even if both sides agreed to a human rights pact in the coming months,
the delegations would almost certainly deadlock again over the remaining points on the dialogue
agenda, which include "demilitarization," plus an array of guerrilla-proposed social, economic,
and constitutional reforms. "In our counter-proposal, we are trying to accelerate the discussion of
basic issues, which Serrano is trying to minimize by focusing instead on the simple logistical issues
of demobilization," said Gaspar Llom, one of the URNG's four top commanders. "Primary issues
cannot be brushed aside, such as human rights, respect for the rights of the indigenous population,
the preeminence of civilian over military structures in society, socio-economic problems, and
constitutional reforms. In Guatemala contrary to what President Serrano proposes the root causes of
the armed conflict must first be resolved."
-- End --
